


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
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
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USSR - Nuclear Testing: In another attempt to raise the political costs to the US and Britain of the impending atmospheric tests, the USSR has accepted the eight neutralists' "compromise" proposal for a test ban control system as a basis for further negotiations at Geneva. Soviet delegate Zorin coupled this "concession" with a renewed call for a moratorium on testing while negotiations on the neutralists' proposal proceed. These last-minute maneuvers are intended to blur the USSR's rejection of an effective international control system. Moscow probably will make further moves prior to the US test series to demonstrate its professed desire for an agreement and to point up the alleged US and British opposition to any proposals which might forestall or delay their tests. The Supreme Soviet session which convenes on 23 April may be used as a forum for further appeals for a test moratorium while talks proceed on the neutralists' proposal. The Soviet Government warned, however, that "fruitful negotiations" cannot be held to the accompaniment of nuclear blasts. [REDACTED]

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USSR-Berlin: In a further move reflecting the USSR's desire to improve the atmosphere in Berlin and to enhance prospects for continued East-West talks, Marshal Konev has been replaced by Colonel-General Yakubovsky, who had served just prior to Konev as commander of Soviet forces in East Germany. Konev's recall follows by a few days the announcement that General Clay would return to the US. The announcement of Konev's appointment on 10 August preceded by three days the closure of

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the Berlin sector borders. Konev's selection indicated Khrushchev's concern over the increasingly tense situation in Berlin during the month of August and was intended also to impress the West with the gravity of the situation and the consequent necessity to be more forthcoming in arranging for a negotiated settlement.

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Mali: Although the Mali Government is still opposed to the permanent stationing of a US military mission in Mali, as expressed in its 13 April note responding to a US aid offer, Mali Secretary of State for Defense Diakite subsequently stated that his government wanted US personnel and US Air Force planes to undertake short-term training of the Malian parachute company trained by the US last year. He saw "no objection" to the temporary stationing of US military personnel at the embassy in connection with such a training program. Diakite also expressed interest in having Mali pilots trained in the US and in the acquisition of two or three DC-3 aircraft for eventual use by Mali's paratroops.

Mali has been among those African states which have been receptive to Soviet bloc aid. A 15-man Soviet military mission has been operating in the country since last summer. Since early this year, however, Mali, whose leaders have apparently been impressed by Guinea's acute economic difficulties, has seemed to be moving toward a more neutral position, at least in terms of its foreign aid arrangements. Last month Mali signed a series of economic accords with France which should assure the continuation of a substantial French presence in the country.

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*North Vietnam: A Hanoi broadcast on 19 April welcomed a suggestion made by Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia in a recent speech that an international conference be held on Vietnam. Hanoi's reaction suggests that the Communists may be attempting to stimulate a formal conference bid from the Cambodian chief of state. Both Peiping and Hanoi have previously indicated their interest in "consultations" among signatories of the 1954 Geneva accords.

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The USSR, thus far, has not publicly endorsed such a conference but has requested that Britain, as cochairman of the

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Geneva conference, join it in an appeal to the US to withdraw its "aggressive troops" from Vietnam. The British rejection of the Soviet request may make Moscow more willing to support Sihanouk's initiative. Moscow supported Sihanouk's call for a conference on Laos last year, and the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi has reportedly sounded out the Indian Government on the possibility of an international conference on Vietnam.

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
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


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Japan: Protests of leftist groups against the forthcoming US nuclear tests in the Pacific raise the possibility of disturbances when the tests occur. The recent increase in the number of protests reflects the long-standing sensitivity over nuclear matters among a majority of Japanese which probably can be readily exploited by the leftists. Large crowds usually gather to observe May Day, and the US Embassy notes that agitators might find it easy to incite these to demonstrate against the embassy and other US installations.

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
*Argentina: Military chiefs have given President Guido a near ultimatum that he annul the results of the 18 March elections and order federal control over all of the provinces. Units of the air force and the army reportedly disagree with the "ultimatum" character of these demands and continue to prefer that congress work out constitutional means to restrict Peronista political activities. however, most of the military leaders have decided that all Peronistas should be banned from office and oppose a suggested compromise which would permit some Peronistas, such as those

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
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[elected federal deputies, to take office.] Federal intervention in the provinces would be legal, but only the 192-man Chamber of Deputies, which is meeting in special session through 25 April, has the constitutional right to decide on seating the 47 Peronista deputies on 1 May. In Buenos Aires Province--one of the five where Frondizi imposed federal control--the federal government has already acted to close Peronista offices. Security measures have been strengthened throughout the country, and some Peronistas and leftists have been arrested.

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Soviet Tactics in the Geneva Nuclear Test Talks

Zorin's vigorous effort to force the US and British delegates to reject the neutralists' plan is aimed at establishing a strong justification for a resumption of Soviet testing. The USSR, moreover, is seeking to divert attention from its opposition to an effective control system by appearing to accept the principle of on-site inspections of unidentified seismic events in the USSR.

There were indications over the past three weeks that the USSR was planning a last-minute move to accommodate the nonaligned delegations' appeals for Soviet acceptance of this principle. The initiative of the eight neutralists in formally introducing their "compromise" plan on 16 April provided a valuable opportunity for the bloc delegations to align themselves with the neutralists against the US and Britain and to project an impression of constructive efforts to rescue the conference from the stalemate on the nuclear testing issue.

The ambiguous control provisions in the eight-nation plan offer an easy target for Soviet manipulation and distortion. Zorin interpreted the proposal, which would base an inspection and control system on existing national detection networks, as an endorsement of most of the USSR's position. He contended that the provision that the nuclear powers could "invite" the proposed international commission of scientists, possibly from nonaligned countries, to conduct on-site inspections does not carry a clear obligation to allow such inspections. Zorin added, however, that this does not mean that the Soviet Union will necessarily refuse to permit inspections on its territory.

Despite these maneuvers ostensibly designed to avert failure of the nuclear test talks, Soviet tactics at Geneva have underlined Moscow's unwillingness to pay the price of meaningful concessions to forestall US tests. The Soviet leaders appear confident that international pressures will oblige the US to make further modifications in its position on the crucial control question. A member of the Soviet delegation has frankly acknowledged

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to a US official that in Moscow's view, the control provisions worked out by Western and bloc scientists at Geneva in 1958 are dead. He predicted that the US eventually would come to accept Soviet insistence on a test ban based on national detection systems. [REDACTED]

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